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DISCUSSION PAPER_NO.8 
BUILDING SOCIETY INSTABILITY IN KENYA 
J. LOXLEY 
In countries with advanced, financial institutions building 
societies are regarded as being an essential part of the credit system 
and their stability is rarely questioned. Very little has been written 
about building society business and this seems to indicate the general 
complacency with which the existence of these institutions is accepted. 
Hecent events have shown Kenya building societies to be far 
from stable and special measures had to be taken to prevent their 
collapse. It is the aim of this paper to discover what caused this 
state of affairs and how disaster was averted. Future prospects in the 
light of past experience will also be examined. 
The difficulties which the societies suffered were due to an 
inherent instability in building society structure - that of borrowing 
funds for short periods to lend for extremely long periods of time. An 
analysis of society assets and liabilities will clarify this position. 
The working capital of building societies consists of share 
capital and deposits contributed by the public. Shares are usually of 
large denominations - often as high as £150 each - the dividend varies 
little from year to year - and the society pays income tax on dividends 
on the investors behalf. Long periods of notice are required for 
withdrawal of shares and if full notice is not given, a penalty is 
imposed in the form either of a discount on the value of the shares or 
of a loss of interest. 
The limit to the amount of shares which can be issued is deter-
mined by the number of subscribers and the amount each is prepared to 
buy. Each share carries limited liability. 
Societies accept savings, fixed term and ordinary deposits. 
Eixed deposit facilities are the same as those offered by commercial 
banks - all accrued interest being forfeited for premature withdrawals. 
Again, minimum acceptable deposits are quite high. The important terms 
of operation of ordinary deposits are large minimum acceptable amounts 
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and long periods of withdrawal. In the case of savings accounts 
withdrawal notice required varies with the amount involved: small sums 
being capable of withdrawal at extremely short notice. 
Societies are allowed by law to accept deposits up to a maximum 
of two-thirds of the outstanding mortgage loans. In law a depositor 
has preference over shareholders for receipt of interest and, should the 
society be wound up, for capital payments. Hence depositors have greater 
security for their funds than shareholders and thus deposits usually 
carry lower interest rates than shares. 
Deposit facilities are very similar to those offered by 
commercial banks except that no current accounts are accepted, and in 
all cases (Appendix A) the society rates are usually higher than rates 
on equivalent deposits in banks (minimum deposits are higher and more 
notice of withdrawal is required). Society rates must inevitably be 
more attractive than bank rates since societies do not offer the wide 
range of general banking facilities available to commercial bank 
customers. 
The strict terms of withdrawal are a consequence of the asset 
structure of the societies. Long term loans on mortgages often up to 
15 years, long term government securities, and cash and bank deposit 
reserves form the assets. Since reserves earn little or no interest it 
can be assumed that they will be held at the lowest level consistent 
with the obligation to meet normal expected net capital withdrawals 
(mainly from savings accounts) in any period. 
The other assets are of a long term nature and should ideally 
be financed by long term capital. Since it is always easier to attract 
funds for relatively short periods there is a need to enforce fairly 
rigid withdrawal terms on funds obtained, to give societies time to 
meet any net capital falls in excess of reserves, from net income, loan 
repayments and any investment maturities in the period. 
Unlike commercial banks, their principle competitors for 
public deposits, building societies in Kenya do not have the support of 
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huge head office reserves for their liabilities. In this sense societies 
can be likened to small indigenous banks. They cannot, however, create 
deposits by acquiring assets. They are able merely to hand out existing 
deposits and share capital and so assets holdings are increased only 
after a prior increase in liabilities. Thus lending is strictly limited 
to total capital available and not, as in the case of banks, to 
multiple of liquid reserves. 
Net additions to assets will be consequent upon net increases 
in deposits and shares and net interest accruals less operating 
expenses. Management expenses cannot normally be reduced substantially 
in any period and given the small differential between interest paid on 
liabilities and interest received from assets, any large net increase 
in asset holding can only result from large net increases in deposits 
and share capital. 
Small net capital withdrawals can normally be met out of accum-
ulated reserves but withdrawals of any size will involve paying out funds 
derived from maturing investments, premature sale of investments, 
monthly loan repayments, and surplus income over expenditure in the 
period obviously the amount realizable from these sources will be 
severely limited since the profitability of a society depends largely 
on the extent of mortgage loans advanced and monthly repayments will 
yield only small sums e.g. if the bulk of loans are for 10 years then 
monthly repayments will be only just over 0.8% of total loans outstanding. 
Large withdrawals would have to be met therefore either by a premature 
calling in of outstanding loans or by special assistance from outside 
the society. 
Given large capital withdrawals which involve realising loans 
and investments, the net income of the society will fall more than in 
proportion to the net fall in business, since operating costs will be 
largely the same over a wide scale of operations, and the fall in income 
on every unit of loan and investment realised will be greater than the 
saving in expense on the equivalent unit of capital withdrawn. Net 
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effect on income will depend also on the size of reserves drawn down i.e. 
loss in bank interest. Thus a substantial fall in capital may involve 
a considerable reduction in income and this creates a further problem. 
Under Section 30 of the 1956 Kenya Building Society Ordinance interest on 
capital can only be paid out of gross profit i.e. interest out of returns 
from assets less operating costs. Should a society be in the position 
of not making sufficient profit it could not continue its borrowing 
business (unless special measures were taken) and might even face the 
extreme problem of being confronted with withdrawal demands from all its 
depositors and shareholders. Before it would allow this situation to 
develop, the society would probably increase interest rates on out-
standing loans. 
In economies with well-established financial institutions, 
deposits and shares in building societies are considered to be as 
secure as deposits with commercial banks. The sheer size of building 
societies in such economies the huge reserves held (and the large number 
of branches throughout the diversified economy) guarantee stability. 
Failing the occurrence of a widespread economic depression it is unlikely 
that these societies would ever face the embarrassing capital withdrawals 
envisaged above - and the capital withdrawals rather than the income falls 
would be the main problem although the latter are obviously bye products 
of the former. 
The capital of building societies in the late 1950s however, was 
far from being secure. The reason for this was that nearly all of it 
was contributed by expatriate Europeans, and to some extent Asians who, 
in the absence of any exchange control regulations for inter Sterling 
Area movements of funds, were quite able to transfer their holdings out 
of Kenya should they lose confidence in the economy. Thus there was 
always the possibility that a large run on deposits and share capital 
would occur - one which could not be met out of liquid reserves. Such a 
run did occur after 1960. 
In 1959 five building societies were in operation. Three large, 
well established ones, The Savings and loan Society Ltd., The Pirst 
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Permanent Building Society, and the Kenya Building Society - had shown 
considerable expansion in their activities prior to 1959. The other two 
had only just been established by that year. (See Appendix B). 
The oldest society was the Savings and loan Society ltd. which 
was established in 1949 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Pearl Assurance 
Ltd., incorporated in Tanganyika and licensed under the 1956 Kenya 
Banking Ordinance. After initial difficulties the society first paid 5% 
dividend on preference shares in 1954 and succeeded in wiping out 
accumulated losses in 1955. A steadily rising profit since that time 
enabled a 6% dividend on ordinary shares to be paid in 1960. The mortgage 
advances of the company rose from about £160,000 in 1950 to just over 
£3 Million in 1959 by which time it was the largest building society in 
Kenya. Since the society is registered as a bank it has no building 
society share liabilities but in 1959 its deposits were almost £4 Million. 
Had the society been registered as a building society this deposit/ 
mortgage loan structure would therefore have been illegal. 
The Savings & Loan Society operates in all three East African 
territories but publishes only one balance sheet covering the whole of 
its operations. At the moment the breakdown of its business is; 
Kenya 85% 
Tanganyika 91° 
Uganda 6% 
In the past its Kenya business will have been undoubtedly higher since 
the capital withdrawals mentioned later applied almost entirely to Kenya. 
Thus if figures quoted below for this society are taken to be those of its 
Kenya business there will be a little inaccuracy - but this will not 
interfere with the main trends and arguments. 
The second largest society in 1959 was the First Permanent 
Building Society which was incorporated in Northern Rhodesia and regist-
ered under the Building Society Ordinance of Kenya. In 1959 its mortgage 
loans outstanding stood at £2.7 Million while its deposit and share 
liabilities were £3-2 Million. After several years of losses the society 
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first experienced accumulated profit of £25,000 in 1960. 
The Kenya Building Society was founded in 1913 and was registered 
under the Ordinance in 1956. With mortgage advances at £2 Million in 
1959 and deposit and share liabilities of about £2i Million it was the 
third largest society in Kenya. By that year it had a small accumulated 
profit of about £3,000. 
The other two societies - East Africa Building Society and 
Kentanda Mutual Building Society were (and still are) very small in 
comparison to the above, but deserve as exhaustive treatment as the others 
because their experiences would be invaluable to any new society wishing 
to commence operations in Kenya. 
The East Africa was established in 1958 and by the end of the 
following year had extended mortgage advances of £23,000 - with a share 
capital (no deposits) of £29,000. 
Commencing operations in 1956 the Kentanda Mutual Building 
Society did not lend until 1960 in which year it loaned £4,000 with 
shareholdings at £17,000. Neither of these small companies has made a net 
profit to date, but the policies adopted by their management during and 
since the early 1960's, now mean liquidation for the Kentanda Mutual and 
remarkable expansion for the East Africa Building Society. These policies 
will be discussed later but first the events which had great repercus-
sions on the Kenya building societies at the beginning of this decade 
and the extent of these repercussions need to be examined. 
In February 1960 the first Lancaster House Constitutional 
Conference paved the way for a predominantly African Government in Kenya 
and ultimately for independence. The resulting loss of confidence in the 
economy by European and Asians was expressed in the balance sheets of 
almost all companies accepting funds on deposit from members of these 
communities. The Building Societies were not alone therefore in suffering 
capital withdrawals - but their losses were more spectacular than those 
of most other institutions. 
/In 1959 
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In 1959 total deposit and share holdings of all the building 
societies stood at £10.4 Million. Two years later aggregate deposits and 
shares stood at less than half this figure, and only one society 
(The East Africa Building Society) has since succeeded in improving its 
capital position over and above the 1959 level. 
The level of deposits with the Savings and Loan Society at 31st 
March, 1964 was only 51.3% of the 1959 level while the capital of the 
First Permanent fell almost 60% over the same period. The deposits of 
K.B.S. Ltd. which took over the assets and liabilities of the Kenya 
Building Society in May 1963 now stand at only 34.8% of the December 1959 
level. Between 1960 and 1964 the deposit and share capital of the Kentanda 
Mutual fell by almost a half. 
The problems confronting individual societies during this period 
were quite varied from one to the other and so were the remedial 
measures adopted. 
The Kentanda Mutual Building Society derived the bulk of its 
deposits from Africans and the cause of its capital decline would seem to 
be the 1961-63 depression rather than a lack of confidence on the 
depositor's part. This company had never made a profit, presumably 
because its scale of business has always been very low - and hence over-
head expenses high in relation to total expenditures. Since 1961 the 
steady decline in deposits has been met by a running down of reserves 
from £10,000 to zero, and by sales of investments - at a loss. Recently 
the position has been so bad that the Trust Company Ltd. which controls 
the society, has been giving aid by paying part of overheads and with the 
Registrar's permission, by paying interest to shareholders and depositors. 
The Society has not undertaken any new lending since 1962, although like 
the other societies which have ceased fresh lending - it does to a small 
extant transfer existing mortgages. 
The problem facing the E.A.B.S. during the period was one of 
profit and loss rather than of substantial capital withdrawals. This 
society did not suffer from capital falls possibly because being so 
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small and being Asian controlled, its depositors and share subscribers 
were at that time carefully selected. High administrative costs relative 
to total income, together with a small net interest income seem to have 
been the cause of this society's difficulties. A low level of capital 
liabilities and loan assets, with a small interest differential inevitably 
means a small net interest income. Given the high administrative costs 
relative to total income the company never made a net profit, and in 1963 
gross profit (interest income less management expenses) did not even cover 
interest payments. Thus the society obtained the Registrar's permission 
to pay interest liabilities out of a private loan of £8,5 95 which was 
repaid by the end of the year. All new lending ceased from 1961 to 1963 -
the rise in loans outstanding from 1961—2 being due to the time lag 
between granting a loan and the loan being drawn upon. 
Problems facing the three large societies were, with minor 
differences, essentially of the same nature. Each one lost over 50% of its 
capital, and reserves were reduced to a minimum, the fall in reserves 
being more than proportionate to the withdrawal of capital. The Kenya 
Building Society also realised about one third of its investments over 
the period, although these have now been restored to their old level. 
Since reserves were little more than 10% of liabilities for most 
of the prosperous years, quite clearly these would not cover such huge 
capital withdrawals. Investments were even smaller and premature realiz-
ation involved risks of capital losses. Though the societies had the power 
to call in outstanding loans this action would not have met with much 
success and would have implied hardship or even ruin for most borrowers. 
Consequently outside sources of aid had to be found to prevent the total 
collapse of the building society movement. (See Appendix C). 
Up to December 1961 the Pirst Permanent obtained help from the 
Colonial Development Corporation (now Conmonwealth DC) the Kenya Govern-
ment, Cereals and Sugar Pinance Corporation, and from the commercial banks -
in all amounting to £1,788,700. Since bank: and Cereals and Sugar Finance 
Corporation loans were short-term, and since capital withdrawals continued, 
more extensive aid was required. , , ,, /At the 
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At the request of the Kenya Government and Rhodesia Head Office, 
the CDC agreed, with British Government approval, to undertake responsi-
bility for the East African affairs of the First Permanent consequently 
new limited liability company (East Africa) Ltd. was registered in Kenya 
on 28th December 1961 under the 1956 Banking Ordinance as a subsidiary of 
CDC Share capital of the old society was either repaid or converted into 
deposits, and ownership of existing capital is as follows. 
CDC: £1,000. ordinary shares. £150,000 preference 'shares. 
Kenya' Government:. £50,000 preference shares. 
Tanganyika Govt. £50,000 preference shares. 
All new lending ceased and further special loans were negotiated 
from the three shareholders and the Northern Rhodesia Government. At 31st 
December 1962 these loans were a little under £2.65 million - and just 
over £2 million in 1963* 
CDC loans carry a high rate of interest - 8% - because the 
corporation itself pays high rates for its funds. No details are 
available of repayment arrangements, but obviously these will depend on 
deposit increases and loan maturities. 
The Kenya Government loan also carried an 8% interest rate until 
30th June 1962. Then the Government agreed to accept 50,000 paid up 20/-
7redeemable comulative preference shares in the new company in place 
of £50,000 of the loan. The interest, on the balance of the loan of 
£250,000, was reduced to 6%. Repayment will be as follows -
1965 £50,000 
1966 £100,000 
1967 £100,000 
Source: 1963 Appropriation A/cs. 
Nothing is known of the terms of the other Special Loans but the 
interest rate can be expected to be not less than 6%. 
While the above aid was not given to Kenya branches specially, 
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but to the society in general, it was needed purely to meet capital 
withdrawals experienced by Kenya branches. 
The measures talc en to assist the Kenya Building Society followed 
similar lines to those adopted for the First Permanent. After receiving 
considerable aid from CBC Norwich Union Insurance Societies and Barclays 
Bank DCO throughout 1961 and 1962, the company was reformed as a limited 
liability subsidiary company of CDC, registered under the Banking 
Ordinance on 1st May 1963. With an ordinary share capital of £100, the 
KBS Ltd. continues to receive aid from CDC, Norwich Union and Barclays 
Bank DCO on the same terms as the old society - although apart from these 
on CDC loans these terms are not known. CDC secured total loans carry 
8% interest - unsecured (100,000 31.12.63) carry 6 1/8% interest. Total 
aid rendered at 31.12.63 stood just over £1.4- million. As in the case of 
the first Permanent - all new lending ceased in March 1960. 
The Savings and loan Society Ltd. has, since 1961, likewise 
refused to undertake new lending and has also received large amounts of 
aid from CDC and the holding company - Pearl Assurance Ltd. Repayment of 
these loans has been extremely prompt and another £50,000 is shortly to 
be paid back to CDC, leaving total special loans of £400,000 outstanding. 
CDC rate is 8% while that on Holding Company loans is a very favourable 
Again, like the first Permanent although the savings and Loan 
Society operates in all 3 territories aid was given to meet Kenya capital 
withdrawals - any drains on resources of Uganda and Tanganyika branches 
being very small. 
Thus at the present time only one society is entirely free from 
outside assistance - and only this society - EABS is undertaking new 
lending. It is significant that this particular company declined the 
offer of help from CDC because it thought its terms unacceptable. It has 
been in a position to dispense with long term outside aid because of its 
success in attracting new deposits. Indeed deposits and share capital 
have more than doubled since 1961. Thus it has had the necessary funds 
...../with which 
with which to undertake new lending. Furthermore its loan interest of 
10% p.a. is much higher than any rate ever charged by a society in Kenya. 
Despite this the Society still finds the demand for loans far in excess 
of funds available. 
By increasing its total business and by widening the differential 
between interest paid on deposits and that received on loans the EABS 
seems to have solved its profit and less problems. 
The significance of the experience of the EABS is that it 
succeeded in increasing its total capital, without resort to special 
aid or any scale, by taking pains to attract African depositors. Its 
advertisements are printed in several local languages and its deposit 
rates are as attractive as those offered elsewhere. While individual 
African deposits are characterised by a rapid turnover, the society has 
found that the aggregate does not over time fluctuate noticeably. 
The Kentanda has not succeeded in attracting new deposits and 
consequently its business has continued to deteriorate. The management 
do not believe that small African deposits provide stable capital and 
hence have not deliberately tried to attract these. Its view is based to 
some extent on past experience, since some time ago it had an agreement 
with the Government whereby the wages of some African employees in the 
service of the Government were paid straight into the society. The idea 
was that some at least of these deposits would remain for a reasonable 
length of time with the society. Since this was not the case to any 
acceptable extent, the scheme was abandoned. But this instability should 
not be taken to apply to African depositors in general, since those who 
normally deposit do so willingly and presumably because they can afford 
it, and not because they have no choise. 
The office of the KMBS is badly positioned, situated on the 
second floor of an office block and since it does not advertise on any 
scale its deposits could not be expected to increase. 
At the moment negotiations are well advanced for the CDC or one 
of its subsidiary building societies to take over the existing mortgages 
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of the Kentanda Mutual. The society will be paid for these assets and it, 
in turn, will wind up its business by paying off share and deposit 
holders. 
The present position with regard to the three large societies 
is as follows:- They are each heavily indebted to outsiders and are not 
undertaking new lending since all surplus income and mortgage repayments 
must go towards building up reserves and repaying special loans, loan 
repayment are in general geared to net mortgage redemptions and hence 
will take some time to pay. These societies therefore are winding down 
their assets and decreasing in size annually. 
Since bank loans will carry interest of at least 7% and CDC loans 
6-g-- 7%, the sooner are these special loans repaid the better it will be 
for the companies from an income point of view. New lending can only be 
undertaken given a huge increase in .deposits. It would seem that the 
societies must necessarily turn their attention to that class of people 
whose income has been undergoing considerable increases since Independence, 
i.e. the newly emerging African middle-class. This class derives its 
income from essentially non-agricultural forms of employment (Civil 
Service and General Government Service) and consequently deposits would 
be unlikely to fall by much should the country suffer a depression. 
Moreover, since these depositors would be Kenya citizens the societies 
would never have to fear outflows of funds from the country. The East 
Africa Building Society seems to have reasonably successful in attracting 
these depositors. 
One Society at least - The Savings and Loan Society Ltd., still 
finds the bulk of its deposits contributed by Europeans and makes no 
special efforts to attract African deposits. Undoubtedly this society 
has made a very strong recovery on the basis of its present deposit 
policy, but should there be another loss of confidence by Europeans, 
given present exchange control arrangements, the Society would again find 
itself in an embsarassing position. 
./ The distribution 
The distribution of deposits by community for the First 
Permanent (E.A.) Ltd. and KBS Ltd. is not known. 
Given the future demise of the Kentanda mutual and the fact that 
the KBS Ltd. and the First Permanent have failed completely in their 
efforts to attract new deposits (The KBS has only one branch) and seem to 
be declining - only the EABS has an immediate bright future. This is 
undoubtedly because of its small size. In terms of aggregate capital 
and loans of societies it is of small importance. 
Thus the present building society structure in Kenya is still 
without firm foundations and is likely to remain so until the economy 
becomes sufficiently diversified to safeguard a multi branch society 
from a depression in any one sector. Only then would a large Kenya-wide 
society structure be capable of secure development. General exchange 
control regulations would add to the security of deposits - especially 
those of the Savings and Loan Society. Should an indigenous banking 
movement ever arise in Kenya, in the absence of lender of last resort 
facilities, it too would benefit from exchanging control regulations and 
a well diversified economy. 
At the moment there is a large unsatisfied demand for building 
society loans and building land and house prices are regarded as being 
less artificially inflated than they were before lending ceased. The 
East African Building Society is enjoying the benefit of these market 
conditions. The others cannot until their loans are repaid which should 
be in about two years for the Savings and Loan Society and not less than 
3 years for the First Permanent. 
When new lending is recommenced Savings and Loan will still 
have Pearl Assurance as a lender of last resort, while CDC will perform 
this role for the First Permanent and KBS. Since CDC is primarily 
interested in loans for new development - rather than for the purchase of 
existing assets - and since its resources are obtained at very high rates 
of interest, it is doubtful whether it is the right type of institution 
to control the societies. 
. ...../ In 1961 
In 1961 the British. Government had a moral obligation to protect 
society borrowers - who were mainly British since, had no assistance been 
forthcoming to the societies, the only alternative would have been to 
press borrowers for immediate loan repayments. In the not too distant 
future most borrowers are likely to b^ from the African middle class 
and perhaps when all CDC loans have been repaid, the Kenya Government or 
a Government sponsored body (such as the Industrial Development Corpo-
ration) might be better suited to take over control of the two societies 
in question. 
Even igno?-iri.g the ownership problem, it would seem desirable for 
Government to be in a position to direct all the societies generally as 
part of the monetary institutional framework, as well as to assist them 
in emergencies - just as it would be called upon to direct and guarantee 
emergency help to indigenous banks. 
In Britain building societies are not influenced directly by 
monetary policy. Their interest rates are not immediately sensitive to 
Bank Rate charges and respond, if at all, only after a time lag. Their 
operations are, however, affected by the impact of monetary control on 
other institutions - especially on commercial banks. Societies must offer 
more attractive deposit terms than banks and so are likely to raise rates 
after banks have done so. Also society funds are often withdrawn to meet 
repayment demands from banks and other organisations undergoing credit 
restriction or contraction. 
When Kenya has a Central Bank in the near future it could profit 
from Britain's experience in monetary management by ensuring from the 
outset that credit policies have general application over the whole range 
of financial institutions including building societies. Control over 
societies while they are in an embrioric state will lay the foundations 
for successful direction of a fully developed movement whose contribution 
to credit flows should be substantial. 
The Central Bank could control societies as well as provide 
lender of last resort facilities to meet emergencies. This latter would 
be an unusual task for a Central Bank based on traditional models - for 
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though, the emergency assistance would be temporary when compared with the 
life of mortgage loans - it would be long term in comparison with lender 
of last resort assistance to commercial banks: But the idea should not 
be condemned on these grounds. Central Banks in developing countries need 
to adopt flexible and immaginative policies and monetary tools, and 
successful departures from traditional Central Banking activities are 
to be encouraged. Moreover there are precedents in Prance and the U.S.A. 
for Government establishing last resort facilities for building societies -
though not directly through a Central Bank. 
Under French law societies must cover 60% of their liabilities 
with other financial institutions and in practice commercial banks under-
take to discount mortgages when necessary. The banks in turn receive 
guarantees of financial assistance from the Bank of Issue. 
In the U.S.A. assistance can be had by societies along the same 
lines as the commercial banks receive assistance under the Federal Reserve 
System. In return for an investment, equivalent to 2% of outstanding 
mortgage loans, in the Federal Home Loan Bank System, societies can 
receive aid to the amount of 50% of loan assets. These special loans are 
granted either to enable an increase in mortgage lending to meet capital 
withdrawals. For additional security societies can issue shares and 
deposits with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, while 
a Federal National Mortgage Administration is prepared to take over 
certain types of mortgages in difficult times. 
Commercial banks in Kenya can be expected to be fully loaned up 
in the forseeable future and hence emulation of the French system would 
be difficult. On the other hand the American system would be too clumsy 
given the small number of societies. All that is needed is one body pre-
pared to provide funds in emergency, against the security of first mort-
gages. This in itself dispenses with the need to guarantee deposits 
separately - since this provision would automatically guarantee capital. 
In any case a deposit guarantee system of the American type would inevi-
tably fail if all societies experienced difficulties, whereas Central 
/Bank assistance 
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Bank: assistance could be obtained by any number of the societies. It 
would not be advisable for the Bank to provide capital for increased 
lending, as the F.H.L.B's do in the U.S.A. since in normal circumstances 
societies should be self sufficient - lending to the public funds 
borrowed from the public and in any case except for contingency funds, 
Central Bank resouoes would be fully employed in other directions. 
To bring societies within the sphere of monetary control the 
Bank: would need to be capable of influencing volume and terms of business 
at all times and not just when societies are receiving special assistance. 
Close consultation between Bank and societies on such matters as size of 
reserves, rates on borrowing and lending, and also perhaps on maximum 
proportion of property value to be loaned and conditions of loan repayment, 
would be necessary. 
These arrangements would assist the future growth of a stable 
building society structure in Kenya and would strengthen both general 
and selective credit control by the Central Bank over the monetary system. 
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DEPOSIT & YEAR LIQUID DEPOSITS INVEST-
YEAR SOCIETY SHARES (+ or -) RESERVES SHARES MORTGAGES MENTS 
1962 FP 1,381,940 -17.84 19,354 1.40 2,960,839 0 
KBS 881,000 -25.6 - 0 1,806,000 190,000 
S&LS 2,167,079 - 0.5 301,000 13.9 3,635,960 86,916 
KMBS 11,000 -31.25 1,000 9.0 7,000 2,000 
EABS 45,000 -35.6 — 0 30,813 _ 
TOTAL 4,486,019 -11.66 321,354 7.1 8,440,602 278,916 
1963 FP 1,335,439 - 3.3. 30,055 2.2 2,772,247 0 
KBS 860,355 - 2.4 249,000 29.0 1,566,945 291,139 
S&LS 2,354,033 + 8.6 165,077 7-0 3,279,581 86,916 
KMBS 8,700 -18.0 - 0 7,000 1,000 
EABS 98,500 +11. 9 12,800 13.0 60,500 4,200 
TOTAL 4,657,027 + 3.8 456,932 9.8 7,686,323 305,055 
Notes 
Figures are for 31st December for First Permanent, KBS., & EABS. 
For Savings and Loan Society 31st March: consequently figures for 
31st March 1959 are consolidated with 31st December 1958 figures of 
other societies and so on backdating for each year. Kentanda figures 
are for 30th June - this fact does not alter aggregates much, due to 
small size of the society. 
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